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INTRODUCTION
Five years ago, Shelby County v. Holder1 released nine states and
fifty-five smaller jurisdictions from the preclearance obligation set
forth in section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).2 This obligation
mandated that places with a history of discrimination in voting ob-
tain federal approval—known as preclearance—before changing any
electoral rule or procedure.3 Within hours of the Shelby County
decision, jurisdictions began moving to reenact measures section 5
had specifically blocked.4 Others pressed forward with new rules
that the VRA would have barred prior to Shelby County.5
1. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2. Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 [https://perma.cc/
7KFN-PNH5] (data as of Aug. 6, 2015).
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10305 (Supp. III 2016)) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
4. See, e.g., Sandy Hodson, City Wins Lawsuit over Change in Election Date for Local Of-
fices, AUGUSTA CHRON. (May 13, 2014, 5:39 PM), http://www.augustachronicle.com/news/
government/elections/2014-05-13/city-wins-lawsuit-over-change-election-date-local-offices
[https://perma.cc/5RYJ-69WW] (reporting that Augusta changed the date of its elections short-
ly after Shelby County even though the Justice Department had blocked a similar measure
in 2012); Ed Pilkington, Texas Rushes Ahead with Voter ID Law After Supreme Court Deci-
sion, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2013, 3:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/25/
texas-voter-id-supreme-court-decision [https://perma.cc/KF76-9MBK] (reporting that, on the
day the Supreme Court decided Shelby County, Texas moved to implement a voter ID law that
had been denied preclearance); Harvy Rice, Lawsuit Says Galveston Remap Discriminatory,
HOUSTON CHRON. (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/
texas/article/Lawsuit-says-Galveston-remap-discriminatory-4761878.php [https://perma.cc/
4523-2E7K] (reporting on Galveston County’s change from nine justices of the peace to four
shortly after Shelby County, a move the Justice Department rejected in 2012). 
5. See, e.g., Associated Press, Voting Rights Act Ruling Clears Path for Mississippi Voter
ID Use in 2014 (Updated), GULFLIVE.COM (June 25, 2013, 5:41 PM), http://blog.gulflive.com/
mississippi-press-news/2013/06/voting_rights_act_ruling_clear.html [https://perma. cc/4XJZ-
ZZB9] (reporting, the day after Shelby County was decided, that a new voter ID law would be
enacted); Kim Chandler, Alabama Photo Voter ID Law to Be Used in 2014, State Officials Say,
AL.COM (June 25, 2013, 5:07 PM), http://blog.al.com/wire/2013/06/alabama_photo_voter_id_
law_to.html [https://perma.cc/2J57-LH3T] (explaining that Shelby County paved the way for
a stricter voter ID law in Alabama); Sylvia Garcia & Larry Peacock, Redistricting Proposal
Targets Hispanic Gains, HOUSTON CHRON. (Nov. 1, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://www.chron.com/
opinion/outlook/article/Garcia-Peacock-Redistricting-proposal-targets-4947300.php [https://
perma.cc/3YK7-AKVU] (explaining that new legislation that would change single-member to
at-large districts in Pasadena would decrease Latino representation); Laura Leslie, NC Voter
ID Bill Moving Ahead with Supreme Court Ruling, WRAL.COM (June 25, 2013), http://www.
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Shelby County opened a spigot. From it, new electoral restrictions
flowed, regulating both how voters cast ballots and the structures
in which they cast them. These practices make electoral participa-
tion demonstrably more difficult for minority voters and hence were
—or would have been—deemed “retrogressive” under the section 5
preclearance regime.6 Prior to Shelby County, section 5 prevented
covered jurisdictions from implementing such retrogressive electoral
practices.7
In the years since Shelby County, plaintiffs have relied on section
2 of the VRA to challenge those retrogressive electoral practices that
section 5 would have blocked. Section 2 proscribes practices that
“result[ ] in a denial or abridgment of the right ... to vote,” and
defines such practices as those that leave minority voters with “less
opportunity ... to participate ... and to elect representatives of their
choice” than white voters.8 This standard has been construed to in-
volve a comparison between the challenged practice and a “hypo-
thetical alternative” of “what the right to vote ought to be,” rather
than a mandated comparison between a present practice and a prior
one.9 
Courts, nevertheless, have long considered prior practices as part
of section 2’s “totality of circumstances” review.10 Specifically, they
have treated evidence that a challenged practice diminishes elec-
wral.com/nc-senator-voter-id-bill-moving-ahead-with-ruling/12591669 [https://perma.cc/
5NET-EYUE] (reporting that North Carolina’s new voting law enacting stricter requirements
for photo IDs would move forward without the preclearance requirement).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp.
2d 113, 144 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013); Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2002) (three-judge court), vacated, 539 U.S. 461
(2003).
8. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)-(b) (Supp. III 2016) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)).
9. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 320, 334 (2000)
(emphasis omitted); see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I), 520 U.S. 471,
477-80 (1997) (“[W]e have consistently understood [sections 2 and 5] to combat different evils
and, accordingly, to impose very different duties upon the States.” (citing Holder v. Hall, 512
U.S. 874, 893 (1994) (plurality opinion))); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1016-17 (1994)
(holding that failure of a districting plan to maximize minority representation was not a
violation of section 2 because such maximization went beyond what the Court considered fair
and equal participation); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880-82 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(dismissing as irrelevant the widespread use of a five-person commission in a section 2
challenge, claiming a one-person commission dilutes minority voting strength).
10. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
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toral opportunities for minority voters as relevant—though, notably,
not dispositive—evidence of legal injury under section 2.11 A number
of courts considering section 2 challenges since Shelby County have
continued to engage in such comparisons, treating evidence of back-
sliding and the relish with which some jurisdictions have engaged
in it to be probative evidence of a section 2 injury.12
Since Shelby County, this established approach has sparked
increasing opposition. A number of states and local governments—
both in once-covered jurisdictions13 and in places where section 5
never applied14—have argued that retrogression was a concern
under section 5 and section 5 alone, and thus that the backsliding
retrogression described is no longer suspect in Shelby County’s
wake. Under this view, comparing a challenged electoral practice
with its predecessor has no place in section 2 litigation. Instead, the
equality of opportunity section 2 protects is thought satisfied so long
as the challenged practice compares favorably to practices employed
in other jurisdictions. More specifically, the disputed practice, no
matter how retrogressive, is permissible so long as it is no worse
than the most restrictive practice used in other places.15 After all,
11. See, e.g., LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 435 (2006) (cataloging ways in which the “old
District 23” served the Latino population better than “new District 25”); see also infra Part
I.
12. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en
banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D.
Tex. 2017); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
rev’d in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); see also
infra Part I.
13. See, e.g., Defendant City of Pasadena’s Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 10, Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (No.
4:14-cv-03241) (arguing that plaintiff ’s claim that the move from eight to six single-member
districts places plaintiffs in a less advantageous position rests on retrogression analysis that
is impermissible under section 2); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, North Carolina v.
League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015) (No. 14-780) (arguing that the court
below erred by improperly conducting a section 5 retrogression analysis for an alleged section
2 violation); see also infra Part II. 
14. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellant, The Ohio General Assembly at 2-3, Ohio State
Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-3877) (arguing that
appellees “resort[ ] to an impermissible retrogression analysis” in their section 2 claim); see
also infra Part II.
15. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 367 (M.D.N.C.
2014) (recognizing the argument that a state could not be held liable under “Section 2 merely
for maintaining a system that does not count out-of-precinct provisional ballots” when most
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the argument goes, why should a state be held liable for making an
electoral practice less generous when other states employ that very
practice without penalty?
The most direct response comes from section 2’s text, its history,
and the long-standing precedent construing it.16 Section 2’s “totality
of circumstances” review means what it says—namely, that all cir-
cumstances are relevant to the statutory inquiry.17 No single factor
standing alone—be it retrogression or an unfavorable comparison
to practices elsewhere—establishes a violation of section 2.18 Nor
does compliance with any particular factor or condition—be it
nonretrogression or a favorable comparison to practices in other
places—offer immunity from liability.
There is, however, an even more fundamental problem with re-
cent efforts to immunize retrogressive practices when comparable
or more restrictive practices exist elsewhere. Animating these ef-
forts is the belief that an electoral rule is best examined independ-
ently from the system in which it operates. Excising evidence of
backsliding from the section 2 inquiry isolates the challenged
practice from the practice it supplants. Immunizing an electoral
practice when a more restrictive one may be found elsewhere sim-
ilarly ignores how an electoral rule operates in context. Reinforcing
one another, both moves insist that the context in which the chal-
lenged practice operates is irrelevant to the section 2 inquiry. The
statutory prohibition is not simply narrowed, but transformed.
What was a nuanced inquiry into the opportunities for political
participation is reduced to an ever-sinking floor with jurisdictions
inoculating each other by adopting increasingly restrictive electoral
practices.
The resulting race to the bottom is cause for serious concern. The
validity of an electoral practice under section 2 has always depended
critically on the context in which states used the practice. The new
states “have made the decision not to count such ballots”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). 
16. See Michael J. Pitts, Rescuing Retrogression, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 741, 742 (2016)
(arguing “that the section 5 retrogression test should be ‘rescued’ by importing it into the
section 2 results framework” and that evidence of backsliding “should create a strong pre-
sumption that the newly adopted voting law violates the section 2 results test”).
17. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (Supp. III 2016).
18. See, e.g., Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 675-76 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
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approach, which has seen mixed success so far, would derail that. It
ignores how voters experience the electoral process in terms of both
the benefits they derive and the burdens they face. Instead, it limits
cognizable injuries to practices that fall below the least protective
extant practice, which it also views in isolation from the rules with
which that practice operates. In so doing, this decontextualized
approach redefines what constitutes the injury under section 2 in a
way that betrays Congress’s intent and the role section 2 needs to
play at this moment.
Part I of this Article examines the scope and application of sec-
tions 2 and 5 of the VRA in the years preceding Shelby County,
noting salient differences between the two provisions, as well as the
ways in which they overlap. This Part looks at how courts have
treated backsliding in section 2 cases that predate Shelby County,
the treatment of section 2 in Shelby County itself, and the role the
decision suggests the provision should play going forward.
Part II looks at the ways in which litigants and courts have ad-
dressed backsliding in section 2 cases that postdate Shelby County.
While evidence of retrogression continues to be treated as relevant
to the legal inquiry under section 2, a number of defendants, their
amici, and a few courts have sought to excise all evidence of back-
sliding from section 2 cases.
Part III argues that backsliding is not immaterial under section
2 but instead is a critical component of the local appraisal the stat-
ute mandates. It shows how the effort to excise evidence of backslid-
ing from section 2 threatens to replace this multifactored contextual
analysis with a fixed rule that would immunize an electoral practice
from challenge so long as it is no more restrictive than the most
restrictive electoral practice presently in use. The result would be
a troublesome race to the bottom in electoral practice, in which the
equality of opportunity section 2 guarantees would be satisfied by
whatever limited opportunities the most restrictive extant electoral
practice allows.
A short conclusion follows.
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I. SECTION 2 AND SECTION 5
Prior to Shelby County, the two core provisions of the VRA oper-
ated side by side. Distinct provisions, sections 2 and 5 differed in
purpose and application.
Section 5, the preclearance standard first enacted in 1965, applied
only in places that utilized voting tests or devices and had very low
voter participation on designated dates.19 Section 5 required these
“covered” jurisdictions to obtain preclearance, or approval from
federal officials, before changing “any voting qualification or pre-
requisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting.”20 To obtain preclearance and, thus, be able to implement
new electoral rules, covered jurisdictions needed to demonstrate
that the proposed change “neither has the purpose nor will have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color” or, as of 1975, membership in specified language minority
communities.21 Jurisdictions bore the burden of proof, and those
unable to make the required showing were unable to implement the
proposed change.22
Under section 5, an electoral change has long been understood to
“deny[ ] or abridg[e] the right to vote” if it made electoral participa-
tion more difficult for the groups it protected.23 The Supreme Court
explained that “the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no
voting procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retro-
gression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”24 The Justices accord-
ingly read section 5 to mandate a comparison between a proposed
19. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. 435, 438-39 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303-10304 (Supp. III 2016)) (designating for coverage political
subdivisions that on dates in 1964, 1968, and 1972 used identified prerequisites for voting and
in which less than 50 percent of eligible voters registered or voted in the presidential election
during that cycle).
20. Id. § 5.
21. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a).
22. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 n.18 (1980) (noting that cov-
ered jurisdictions bear the burden of proof in the preclearance process), abrogated by Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
23. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 139 (1976). 
24. Id. at 141.
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electoral practice and the one it would supplant to determine
whether the change would make voting more difficult for minority
voters.25 Notably, the retrogression standard allowed jurisdictions
to maintain discriminatory practices so long as changes to them did
not make matters even more difficult for minority voters.26
Section 2 differs in scope and substance. The provision applies
nationwide, rather than just in designated jurisdictions.27 It lacks
an expiration date and hence was never subject to periodic renew-
als. Section 2 does not employ section 5’s unusual burden-shifting
apparatus, and instead places the burden on the plaintiffs to prove
the invalidity of a challenged practice.28 Section 2 thus more closely
resembles conventional antidiscrimination law than section 5 ever
did.
Section 2’s substantive requirements also differ from section 5’s.
Since the 1982 Amendments to the VRA, section 2 has barred elec-
toral practices that “result[ ] in a denial or abridgment of the right
... to vote.”29 It defines such practices as those that leave minority
voters with “less opportunity ... to participate in the political
processes and to elect representatives of their choice” than white
25. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478-79, 487-91 (2003), superseded by statute on
other grounds, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Re-
authorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577, as recognized
in Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015); Bossier Parish II, 528
U.S. 320, 334 (2000); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 982-83 (1996) (plurality opinion); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883 (1994) (plurality opinion).
26. See, e.g., Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 498-99 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part) (noting the majority’s view that the disputed plan lacked a retro-
gressive effect because the parish lacked Black representation prior to the plan’s adoption);
City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1983) (holding that maintenance of
practices that could be discriminatory “under some circumstances” should be precleared
because “the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimination”).
27. Compare 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016) (prohibiting “any State or political sub-
division” from imposing voting practices that “result[ ] in a denial or abridgement of the right
of any citizen ... to vote”), with id. § 10304(a) (requiring preclearance whenever “a State or
political subdivision” identified in § 10303(a) attempts to change voting procedures).
28. See id. § 10301; see also Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 480 (“Section 5 ... imposes upon
a covered jurisdiction the difficult burden of proving the absence of discriminatory purpose
and effect.”).
29. Compare Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016)), with Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, 96 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)
(Supp. III 2016)). 
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voters have.30 The statute, moreover, dictates that standard be
assessed based on “the totality of circumstances.”31
Thus, in contrast to section 5, which imposed what Congress
intended to be a relatively straightforward standard,32 section 2
rejects a bright line in favor of a multifactored inquiry under which
a single factor can neither establish liability nor immunize a chal-
lenged practice. In part, section 2 allows for a more complex and
flexible assessment because it does not depend on section 5’s in-
verted burden allocation, which placed on subject jurisdictions the
obligation to prove the legality of their rules prior to implementa-
tion.33 
The complexity of the section 2 inquiry also reflects the nature of
the substantive right the statute protects. While section 5 “prevents
nothing but backsliding,” section 2 combats “discrimination more
generally,”34 which it locates in those electoral practices that leave
minority voters with “less opportunity ... to participate and to elect
representatives of their choice.”35 In crafting this standard, Con-
gress was explicit that the conditions that provide an equal oppor-
tunity to participate in the political process hinge on context.36
Hence, it mandated an assessment “based on the totality of circum-
stances”37 and further instructed that these circumstances be “of the
30. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
31. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 16 (1982) (stating that section 2 requires an assess-
ment “of the total circumstances of the local electoral process”).
32. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883-84 (1994) (noting that “[t]he baseline for
comparison is present by definition; it is the existing status” and thus “[w]hile there may be
difficulty in determining whether a proposed change would cause retrogression, there is little
difficulty in discerning the two voting practices to compare to determine whether retrogres-
sion would occur” (citing 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b) (1993))); cf. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 95-
98 (1997); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 145-46 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a); Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997) (“Section 5 already
imposes upon a covered jurisdiction the difficult burden of proving the absence of discrimina-
tory purpose and effect.... To require a jurisdiction to litigate whether its proposed redistrict-
ing plan also has a dilutive ‘result’ before it can implement that plan ... is to increase further
the serious federalism costs already implicated by § 5.” (citing Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 219 (1960))); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 n.18 (1980) (stating
covered jurisdictions bear the burden of proof in the preclearance process), abrogated by
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
34. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 334-35 (2000); Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 477, 480-
82.
35. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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local electoral process.”38 As such, section 2 rejects reliance on “[a]n
inflexible rule”39 and requires instead “a searching practical evalu-
ation of the ‘past and present’ reality, and on a ‘functional’ view of
the political process.”40
Practices challenged under section 2 are not assessed in the ab-
stract nor judged along a single dimension. They must instead be
evaluated as part of the web of electoral rules that organize the way
voters vote in the jurisdiction. In other words, section 2’s totality of
circumstances standard means just that, namely, that all circum-
stances are relevant. No single factor standing alone establishes a
violation of section 2 nor does the failure of a jurisdiction to satisfy
a specific factor mean it violated the statute.41 Context means that
an electoral practice might run afoul of section 2 in one place but
operate benignly in another.42
For these reasons, retrogression alone does not suffice to establish
a section 2 violation. Not sufficient, however, does not mean wholly
irrelevant. The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 Amendments
to section 2 states that “[p]laintiffs could not establish a Section 2
violation merely by showing that a challenged reapportionment or
annexation, for example, involved a retrogressive effect on the polit-
ical strength of a minority group.”43 As one federal appellate panel
pointed out, the Report’s use of the word “‘merely’ ... simply estab-
lishes that challengers cannot show a Section 2 violation only on the
basis of retrogressive effects.”44 
The Senate Report, moreover, anticipates comparisons between
past practice and a challenged law. Discussing Senate factor 9,
38. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 16 (1982).
39. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994).
40. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30 &
n.120).
41. See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1018-20; id. at 1026 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding a
“[l]ack of proportionality can never by itself prove dilution, for courts must always carefully
and searchingly review the totality of the circumstances,” while “the presence of proportional-
ity ... is not a safe harbor for the States; it does not immunize their election schemes from § 2
challenge” (citation omitted)).
42. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 (holding “at-large election schemes ... are not per se viola-
tive” of section 2, even though many such schemes do minimize or cancel out minority voting
power in violation of the statute).
43. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 68 n.224.
44. See Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 558 (6th Cir. 2014),
vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). 
2018] SECTION 2 AFTER SECTION 5 1971
which calls for an assessment of “tenuousness,” the Report deems
the fact that “the procedure markedly departs from past practices
or from practices elsewhere in the jurisdiction ... bears on the
fairness of its impact.”45 Hardly immune from scrutiny under the
statute, backsliding was instead seen as one circumstance within
the totality.
The Supreme Court confirmed that backsliding is relevant to the
section 2 inquiry. Thornburg v. Gingles stated that section 2 re-
quires “a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present re-
ality.’”46 Georgia v. Ashcroft would not “equate a § 2 vote dilution
inquiry with the § 5 retrogression standard,” but still recognized
that “some parts of the § 2 analysis may overlap with the § 5
inquiry.”47
More concretely, LULAC v. Perry relied on evidence of retrogres-
sion to hold that Texas violated section 2 when it displaced nearly
one hundred thousand Latino residents from a congressional district
that included Laredo to protect the Republican incumbent the
residents refused to support.48 Justice Anthony Kennedy’s plurality
opinion in LULAC noted that before Texas adopted the contested
plan, Latino voters in Laredo were “cohesive,” “politically active,”
and “poised to elect their candidate of choice.”49 The new district
“undermined [their] progress” and “[i]n essence ... took away the La-
tinos’ opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it.”50 In
short, evidence of backsliding fueled the Court’s conclusion that “the
State must be held accountable for the effect of [its districting]
choices in denying equal opportunity to Latino voters.”51
45. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 n.117; see also Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 768
F.3d at 558 (observing that the Senate Report “invites” comparison between present and past
practice in its discussion of tenuousness).
46. See 478 U.S. at 45 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 30).
47. 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003) (citing Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883 (1994) (plurality
opinion), superseded by statute on other grounds, Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta
Scott King Voting Rights Reauthorization and Amendment Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246,
120 Stat. 577, as recognized in Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257
(2015)); see Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 486 (1997) (holding that “some ... ‘§ 2 evidence’ may
be relevant” under section 5).
48. 548 U.S. 399, 439 (2006); see also id. at 435 (noting that “the Latino population in
District 23 was split apart particularly because it was becoming so cohesive”).
49. Id. at 438-39.
50. Id. at 439-40.
51. Id. at 441-42.
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Section 2 and section 5 operated concurrently until 2013 when the
Court decided Shelby County v. Holder.52 That decision struck down
section 4(b) of the VRA, a provision that set forth the coverage form-
ula under which jurisdictions came to be subject to the preclearance
requirements of section 5.53 By invalidating section 4(b), Shelby
County rendered section 5 inoperative.54 In so doing, however, Shel-
by County made clear that “Section 2 ... is not at issue in this case”
and that the Court’s “decision in no way affects the permanent,
nationwide ban on racial discrimination” set forth in that provi-
sion.55 Shelby County, accordingly, did not narrow section 2. Indeed,
the Court’s suggestion that section 2 alone provided adequate
protection against racial discrimination in voting indicates that it
anticipated section 2 would continue to operate as it had in the past.
II. BACKSLIDING
After the Supreme Court handed down Shelby County, various
jurisdictions moved quickly to implement restrictive electoral
procedures that section 5 would have blocked.56 Lawsuits followed,
challenging the legality of these new restrictions under section 2 of
the VRA.57 In response, defendant jurisdictions maintained that
evidence of backsliding has no place in the section 2 inquiry and
that courts are precluded from comparing challenged practices to
the ones they supplant.58
Consider, for example, what happened in North Carolina. The
state legislature there had been discussing a relatively modest
election bill when Shelby County was decided.59 Freed from the
constraints of section 5, state legislators moved quickly to pass more
52. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
53. Id. at 2631.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 2619, 2631.
56. See supra notes 4-5.
57. See supra notes 8-9.
58. For an example of this argument long before Shelby County, see Little Rock School
District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 56 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the district court erred in a section 2 case by comparing a challenged redistricting
plan to the prior plan). 
59. H.B. 539, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013).
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comprehensive legislation.60 Enacted on August 12, 2013, Session
Law 2013-381 (SL 2013-381) eliminated or reduced various electoral
practices that had increased voter participation in North Carolina
in the preceding years.61 Specifically, SL 2013-381 scrapped same-
day registration and out-of-precinct voting,62 reduced the period of
early voting from seventeen to ten days, expanded allowable poll
observers and voter challenges, eliminated the discretion of county
boards of election to keep the polls open an additional hour in
extraordinary circumstances, and eliminated “preregistration” of
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who would not be eighteen by the
next general election.63 The new law also mandated a new, more
burdensome voter ID provision.64
The U.S. Department of Justice, along with a number of private
plaintiffs, challenged the new law, claiming it violated both section
2 of the VRA and the Constitution. On July 29, 2016, a panel for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the legisla-
60. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 339 (M.D.N.C.
2016) (noting that the day after Shelby County, the “Republican Chairman of the [Senate]
Rules Committee[ ] publicly stated, ‘I think we’ll have an omnibus bill coming out’ and ... that
the Senate would move ahead with the ‘full bill’”), rev’d and remanded, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir.
2016), cert. denied sub nom. North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S.
Ct. 1399 (2017).
61. Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381. For details on the
repealed provisions, see Danielle Chemtob, A Brief Overview of North Carolina’s Tumultuous
Voting Rights History, DAILY TAR HEEL (Aug. 29, 2016, 11:55 PM), http://www.dailytarheel.
com/article/2016/08/a-brief-overview-of-north-carolinas-tumultuous-voting-rights-history
[https://perma.cc/ UB9P-UPB7]; see also N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F. Supp.
3d at 332 (observing that the new provisions “repeal certain voting and registration mechan-
isms enacted since 1999”).
62. Same-day registration (SDR) allowed eligible voters to register and vote on the same
day. Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 27, 2017), http://www.
ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx [https://perma.cc/
7SQW-8XAM]. Out-of-precinct voting allowed for the counting of ballots for selected races if
registered voters cast ballots in the incorrect precinct within the proper county. Provisional
Ballots, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 19, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx [https://perma.cc/L6Z8-JYT9].
63. §§ 11.1, 12.1, 16.1, 20.2, 25.1, 33.1, 49.1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381. 
64. Id. § 2.1; see N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 496 (noting the
new voter ID provision eliminated public assistance IDs and other government, state uni-
versity, and community college IDs from the list of acceptable IDs); id. at 344-45 (discussing
amendments to the ID measure, enacted weeks before the trial was to start, that expanded
types of qualifying IDs and voting opportunities for voters who lack qualifying IDs, including
the ability to cast a provisional ballot after attesting “a reasonable impediment” kept them
from obtaining a qualifying ID). 
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ture crafted the law to “target African Americans with ... surgical
precision” and hence with racially discriminatory intent in violation
of section 2 and the Constitution.65 On May 15, 2017, the Supreme
Court denied North Carolina’s petition for certiorari.66
During this litigation, North Carolina never denied that SL 2013-
381 made voting more difficult for minority voters and African
American voters in particular. That is, North Carolina never denied
that its new electoral rules were retrogressive within the meaning
of section 5.67 Instead, both the State and the district court main-
tained that retrogression was no longer a problem after Shelby
County.68 By this, they meant not only that, as has long been estab-
lished, retrogression alone is insufficient to establish a violation of
section 2,69 but also, more radically, that such evidence was not
relevant in any way to the inquiry under section 2.70 
Under this view, comparisons between new electoral practices
and the ones they supplant have no place in section 2 litigation.71
65. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017); see also N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory,
997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 334 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (denying a preliminary injunction for the plaintiffs),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769
F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014).
66. North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017). 
67. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (noting that the voting
bill expanded from sixteen to fifty-seven pages after Shelby County, and that “it would not be
unreasonable for the legislature to have believed that some voting changes may survive a § 2
challenge but not one under § 5”). 
68. Id. at 504-05.
69. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (stating that
North Carolina should not be held to be “in violation of Section 2 merely for maintaining a
system that does not count out-of-precinct provisional ballots”).
70. See id. (stating that considerations of prior practice “would import the retrogression
standard of Section 5 into Section 2 cases,” and make the section 2 claim “at least partially
dependent on whether a State” previously used a more generous electoral practice (emphasis
added)); Brief of Appellees at 11, League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d
224 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1845) (arguing that plaintiffs were impermissibly seeking to
“[i]mport a [r]etrogression [s]tandard into Section 2” and that “Section 2 is not concerned with
whether the elimination of a preferred election practice will ‘worsen the position of minority
voters in comparison to the preexisting’ election system” (quoting N.C. State Conference of the
NAACP, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 352)). 
71. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and Volume I of the Appendix at 18, North
Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017) (No. 16-833) (charg-
ing that the appellate court “employed a variant of §5’s anti-retrogression analysis” by “[o]ver
and over again ... return[ing] to the fact that North Carolina had changed its law to remove
voting mechanisms that had existed before,” by “accus[ing] the legislature of ‘re-erect[ing] ...
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Indeed, such comparisons are seen as unauthorized.72 They are also
believed to be dangerous. Both North Carolina and the district court
warned that comparing SL 2013-381 to the rules it replaced could
have “‘dramatic and far-reaching’ effects” given that many states
never provided the expansive practices SL 2013-381 reduced or
eliminated.73 Put differently, basing section 2 liability, even in part,
on North Carolina’s decision to restore rules used widely in other
states “could place in jeopardy the laws of the majority of the
States.”74
Variations on these arguments have been pressed elsewhere. In
Texas, for instance, both the State and smaller jurisdictions within
it responded to Shelby County by enacting retrogressive voting mea-
sures that the preclearance regime had, or would have, blocked.75 In
the section 2 litigation that followed, the relevance of retrogression
has been disputed.
For example, back in 2014, a federal district court held a Texas
voter identification measure known as Texas Senate Bill 14 (SB 14)
violated section 2.76 That ruling,77 and the appellate panel and en
barriers’ ... previous legislatures had lowered,” and by insisting that “removing voting tools
... meaningfully differs from not initially implementing such tools”); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 3, 7-8, North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015)
(No. 14-780) (arguing that the appellate court engaged in impermissible “de facto”
retrogression analysis by viewing state’s prior practices—namely, of allowing SDR and out
of precinct voting—as “‘centrally relevant’ and a ‘critical piece’ of its § 2 analysis” (quoting
League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d. at 242)).
72. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (noting for example that
deciding that the failure to offer same-day registration as a violation of section 2 would
“plac[e] the laws of at least 36 other states [that did] not offer [same-day] registration in
jeopardy”); Brief of Appellees, supra note 70, at 12 (stating that precedent under section 2 did
not support “analyzing an election practice’s effect on minority voters under Section 2 by
comparing it to previous practice”). 
73. Brief of Appellees, supra note 70, at 12 (quoting N.C. State Conference of the NAACP,
997 F. Supp. 2d at 351).
74. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 351, 367; see also N.C.
State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 506 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (“This
court has no way to assess where ‘more equal’—but nevertheless allegedly discrimin-
atory—ends and the ‘equal opportunity’ § 2 mandates begins. This is a significant problem
given that the scope of any remedy imposed by this court ‘must be proportional to the scope
of the violation, and the order must extend no further than necessary to remedy the viola-
tion.’” (citing Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011))), rev’d and remanded, 831 F.3d 204 (4th
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017); Brief of Appellees, supra note 70, at 11-12.
75. See supra note 4.
76. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 632-33 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, rev’d in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); see
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banc rulings that affirmed it, noted that SB 14 had been blocked as
retrogressive prior to Shelby County and that Texas opted to imple-
ment it within hours of the Shelby decision.78 The district court,
moreover, found, and the appellate rulings affirmed, that SB 14
made voting more difficult for minority voters in Texas than it had
been under the prior regime.79 Both the trial and appellate courts
viewed these facts and findings as relevant evidence contributing to
the holding that SB 14 violated section 2. In response, amici
supporting Texas charged that both the trial and appellate courts
impermissibly imported retrogression analysis into the section 2
inquiry.80
A similar charge was lodged when plaintiffs argued and a federal
district court held that a districting plan used to elect city council
members in Pasadena, Texas, violated section 2.81 Under that plan,
council members were elected from six single-member districts and
two at-large districts.82 The district court held the plan to be dilu-
tive, finding, inter alia, that Latino voters enjoyed greater influence
under the prior plan, under which the council was elected from eight
single-member districts.83 The court also noted that the new plan
also 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 622-23 (describing five forms of qualifying identification).
77. Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 636 n.23, 684.
78. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 227 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 612 (2017); Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 498 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, and rev’d in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612
(2017).
79. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 264-65; Veasey, 796 F.3d at 512; Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 693-94.
80. Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress Representing States in the Fifth Circuit
Supporting Petitioners at 11-12, Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017) (No. 16-393) (stating
that, by considering “whether a change makes minorities worse off,” the en banc court “ig-
nor[ed] the requirement of an objective benchmark, ... [and] converted Section 2 into a statute
that requires states to adopt whichever voting regime would most increase the voting rates
and voting power of minorities”); Brief for Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal
Defense Fund in Support of Defendants-Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 9,
Veasey, 830 F.3d 216 (No. 14-41127) (stating the appellate panel’s approach suffered from the
same deficiency it identified in the Fourth Circuit’s assessment of North Carolina’s SL 2013-
381, namely, that it “imported the VRA §5 retrogression analysis ... in a transparent effort to
expand federal authority over states that neither the Constitution nor Congress has ever
sanctioned”). 
81. Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 673-74 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
82. Id. at 673.
83. Id. at 715 (finding that Latino voters were better able to elect representatives of choice
under the old plan than under the new plan, which had fewer and hence larger single-member
districts, and that “Pasadena changed to the 6-2 map and plan precisely because Latinos were
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would not have passed muster prior to Shelby County and that the
city moved to enact it only after the decision lifted the preclearance
requirement.84 For its part, Pasadena denied that the new plan left
Latino voters worse off, but argued that even if it did, retrogression
did not give rise to an injury under section 2, and, thus, evidence of
it should not be considered when evaluating the new plan.85
The relevance of retrogression has also been disputed in section
2 cases brought in places that were never subject to section 5. Ohio,
for instance, has argued that impermissible concerns about retro-
gression underlie a series of section 2 challenges brought against SB
238, a state law that imposed a variety of new electoral restric-
tions.86 In Ohio’s view, these section 2 claims, and the selected
rulings that recognized them, impermissibly compared the new
practices to the ones they replaced.87 Hence, a section 2 challenge
brought against SB 238’s reduced opportunities for early in-person
voting, “resort[ed] to an impermissible retrogression analysis that
compares SB 238 to the prior early voting regime.”88 Similarly, a
lower court characterization of new rules governing provisional and
becoming more successful at winning City Council seats”).
84. See id. at 697.
85. Id. at 712; see Defendant City of Pasadena’s Reply Brief in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment at 10, Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (No. 4:14-CV-03241-LHR) (arguing
that the plaintiff ’s argument is based on an impermissible retrogression analysis “that might
have been cognizable under the now-inapplicable section 5, but not under section 2”); Defen-
dant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 74-75, Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d
667 (No. 4:14-CV-03241-LHR) (arguing that retrogression should not be the standard under
section 2, that the plaintiff ’s argument is based on a faulty premise and that “[r]etrogression
is not the legal standard under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act” and “[r]etrogression was
the inquiry under section 5 but not in section 2 dilution cases”); Defendant’s Memorandum
of Law at 2-3, Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (No. H-14-3241) (also stating that retrogression is
not part of the section 2 standard); cf. Memorandum and Opinion Setting Out Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law at 47, 73-74, Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (No. H-14-
3241) (claiming that retrogression and a dilution analysis would reach the same result in this
case and “plaintiffs are not impermissibly pursuing a retrogression claim”).
86. Reply Brief of Appellant, Ohio General Assembly, supra note 14, at 2-3.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also id. at 26 (stating that plaintiffs’ desired remedy, invalidation of SB 238
and hence a return to the prior regime, “is precisely the retrogression analysis Plaintiffs admit
is not proper under a Section 2 analysis”); Brief of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State Jon
Husted and Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine at 57, Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834
F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-3561) (“[I]n word and deed, retrogression is exactly what [the
district court] did. It evaluated whether Ohio’s new law ‘eliminates voting opportunities that
used to exist.’”).
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absentee ballots “as a ‘rollback’ or ‘retrenchment’ from previous law”
erroneously evaluated the rules against “the one unavailable
[benchmark] under Section 2—Ohio’s prior law.”89
Ohio insisted that such comparisons are impermissible, regard-
less of whether they are invoked as dispositive90 or merely pro-
bative91 evidence of a section 2 violation. Either way, Ohio argued,
such comparisons are not relevant under section 2 and violate
Shelby County’s instruction that retrogression’s “intrusive inquiry”
is no longer warranted.92 
To date, the effort to excise evidence of backsliding from the
section 2 inquiry has been met with mixed success. In Patino, the
district court rejected the city’s claim that comparisons to past
practice were impermissible, noting “§ 2 does not prohibit retrogres-
sion.... But in this case, both dilution and retrogression analyses
lead to the same result.”93 In the litigation over North Carolina’s SL-
381, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit flatly rejected the
effort to exclude evidence of backsliding from section 2’s totality of
89. First Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and
State of Ohio at 52, Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Nos. 16-3603, 16-3691) (quoting Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, No. 2:06-CV-896,
2016 WL 3166251 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 2016)).
90. Reply Brief of Appellant, The Ohio General Assembly, supra note 14, at 30 (arguing
the district court erred when it granted relief “on the basis of a retrogression analysis that
merely compared the number of early voting days before and after SB 238’s enactment”
(emphasis added)).
91. Brief of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and Ohio Attorney General
Mike DeWine, supra note 88, at 4, 17, 56-58 (noting that “the district court used retrogres-
sion” when it said “changes” from the prior practice “disparately affected African Americans
because they used the reduced options” (first emphasis added)); Third Brief of Appellants/
Cross-Appellees Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and State of Ohio at 28, Ne. Ohio Coal.
for the Homeless, 837 F.3d 612 (Nos. 16-3603, 16-3691) (evidence of retrogression does not
belong in section 2’s “totality of circumstances” review, because section 2 requires “a bench-
mark before the totalities”).
92. Brief of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and Ohio Attorney General
Mike DeWine, supra note 88, at 56-57 (“The district court ... read Section 2 as incorporating
intrusive retrogression rules for all 50 States just three years after the Supreme Court struck
down that intrusive inquiry only for certain covered States” and “[s]ection 2 does not bar such
retrogression. That is Section 5’s domain.”); Reply Brief of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State
Jon Husted and Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine at 1, 5, 7-9, 20-21, Ohio Democratic
Party, 834 F.3d 620 (No. 16-3561) (arguing that the plaintiffs were asking for an impermiss-
ible use of the retrogression standard to compare the law to the “previous one, rather than a
hypothetical alternative”).
93. Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 712 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
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circumstances review.94 In its 2014 ruling, the court stated that
prior practices “disproportionately used” by minority voters are
relevant to section 2’s inquiry into equal opportunity.95 In its 2016
ruling, that court stated that “removing voting tools ... meaningfully
differs from not initially implementing such tools.”96 Similarly, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit treated as relevant evidence
that SB 14, the Texas’s voter ID measure, made voting more dif-
ficult for minority voters in Texas than it had been under the prior
regime.97
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has been
more receptive to the effort to exclude evidence of backsliding from
the section 2 inquiry. Initially, a panel in 2014 rejected the claim
outright stating explicitly it was “not improper[ ] engage[ment] in a
retrogression analysis [to] consider[ ] the opportunities available to
African Americans to vote EIP under the prior law as part of the
‘totality of circumstances’ inquiry.”98 The panel invoked section 2’s
text, history, and precedent construing it as supporting the inclu-
sion of evidence of backsliding in its section 2 inquiry.99 The panel’s
decision, however, was subsequently vacated,100 and a later panel
decision issued in 2016 disregarded past practice as relevant to the
94. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d. 224, 241-42 (4th Cir.
2014).
95. Id. (quoting Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 558 (6th
Cir. 2014)).
96. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 232 (4th Cir. 2016)
(citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)) (“[O]nce the franchise is
granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also League of Women Voters of N.C.,
769 F.3d at 241-42 (rejecting the lower court’s holding that section 2 does not include a
retrogression standard and stating that “past practices is part and parcel of the totality of the
circumstances” and “North Carolina’s previous voting practices are centrally relevant under
Section 2”).
97. See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied., 137
S. Ct. 612 (2017); Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 512 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, and rev’d in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied., 137 S. Ct. 612
(2017); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 693-94 (S.D. Tex. 2014), vacated in part, and
reversed in part, 830 F.3d 216, cert. denied., 137 S. Ct. 612.
98. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 557 (6th Cir. 2014),
vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
99. Id. at 557-58 (observing, inter alia, that the Senate Report “invites comparison”
between present and past practice in its discussion of tenuousness).
100. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th
Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
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section 2 injury.101 This decision relied on registration and turnout
data to hold that SB 238 had no racially disparate impact on minor-
ity voters.102 It also emphasized that opportunities for early voting
in Ohio were “really quite generous” when compared to practices in
other states.103 As such, the panel held that SB 238 did not violate
section 2.104 The panel treated as immaterial the fact that minority
voters disproportionately relied on the practices that SB 238 cut
back.105
It remains to be seen whether evidence of backsliding will ulti-
mately fall out of the section 2 inquiry. The argument that it should
continues to be pressed again and again by defendant jurisdic-
tions106 and their amici in post-Shelby County section 2 cases.107 So
101. Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 636-40 (6th Cir. 2016).
102. Id. at 639-40.
103. Id. at 623.
104. Id.
105. See id. 
106. See, e.g., Brief and Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellants, Cross-Appellees at 39,
One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, Nos. 16-3083, 16-3091 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016) (“Importantly,
a State’s prior law is not the comparator in a Section 2 case.”); cf. Plaintiffs-Appellees’
Response and Cross-Appeal Brief at 51, One Wis. Institute, Inc., Nos. 16-3083, 16-3091 (7th
Cir. Oct. 19, 2016) (“The State’s claim that the vote-denial analysis requires comparison of the
challenged practice with an ‘objective benchmark’ is mistaken.”); Reply Brief of Appellants at
12-13, Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-1605) (arguing
that the court’s decision in League of Women Voters v. North Carolina indicates that
retrogression can be used in a section 2 analysis); Brief of Appellees at 55, Lee, 843 F.3d 592
(No. 16-1605) (arguing that section 2 does not allow a retrogression inquiry).
107. Brief of the Public Interest Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 15, North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017)
(No. 16-833); Brief of the States Indiana, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas,
Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Supporting Affirmance at 7, 18,
N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 16-
1468(L), 16-1469, 16-1474, 16-1529); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Rights Union in
Support of Defendants/Appellees and Affirmance at 3-4, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP,
831 F.3d 204 (No. 16-1468(L)); Brief of Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for
Equal Opportunity, and Project 21 in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 7, 11, 18-19, N.C.
State Conference of the NAACP, 831 F.3d 204 (Nos. 16-1468(L), 16-1469, 14-1474, 16-1529);
Amicus Curiae Brief of Judicial Watch, Inc. and Allied Educational Foundation in Support of
Defendants-Appellees and Affirmation at 12-13, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 831 F.3d
204 (Nos. 16-1468(L), 16-1469, 16-1474, 16-1529); Brief of Senators Thom Tillis, Lindsey
Graham, Ted Cruz, Mike Lee, and the Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae in Support
of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance at 18, 28, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 831
F.3d 204 (Nos. 16-1468(L), 16-1469, 16-1474, 16-1529); Brief of the Michigan State Chamber
of Commerce, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Secretary Johnson’s Emergency Motion for
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too, Chief Justice John Roberts felt inclined to remind us that a
denial of certiorari in the North Carolina litigation should not be
mistaken as a judgment on the merits,108 a statement that suggests
a degree of unhappiness with the lower court’s analysis, and, per-
haps, retrogression’s role in the section 2 violation it identified. The
Chief Justice’s apparent interest in a better vehicle through which
to explore post-Shelby County section 2 issues makes clear that the
final word on the relevance of backsliding lies ahead.
III. THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM
The claim that backsliding is immaterial under section 2 rests on
several flawed arguments. As this Part explains, Shelby County
does not mandate the exclusion of retrogression from section 2. Nor
is the exclusion necessary either to ensure jurisdictions are able to
modify electoral rules or to prevent the most expansive extant vot-
ing practice from becoming the minimum practice section 2 allows.
The insistence that backsliding is immaterial also ignores a critical
distinction under section 2 between the elimination of an existing
electoral practice and the failure to enact it in the first place.
Perhaps most problematic, treating backsliding as immaterial por-
tends a destructive race to the bottom in electoral practice. This
Part explains why.
A. Retrogression’s Relevance
Retrogression alone never provided sufficient cause to invalidate
an electoral practice under section 2.109 Section 2’s “totality of cir-
cumstances” test bars judging challenged practices along a single
Stay at 19, Mich. State A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2016) (No.
16-2071).
108. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. at 1400 (“Given the blizzard of filings
over who is and who is not authorized to seek review in this Court under North Carolina law,
it is important to recall our frequent admonition that ‘[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari
imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.’” (quoting United States v.
Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923))).
109. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 68 n.224 (1982) (“Plaintiffs could not establish a section 2
violation merely by showing that a challenged reapportionment or annexation, for example,
involved a retrogressive effect on the political strength of a minority group.”). 
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dimension.110 Still, retrogression’s insufficiency on this point never
meant that it was to be ignored entirely.111 To the contrary, section
2’s “totality of circumstances” test means all aspects “of the local
electoral process” are to be considered.112 This includes evidence that
a practice causes backsliding, as such evidence ties together “the
‘past and present reality’ ”113 and “bears on the fairness of its im-
pact.”114
Nothing in Shelby County changed that approach.115 Shelby Coun-
ty rendered section 5 inoperative by invalidating the coverage
formula that defined where it applied.116 The decision meant that
once-covered jurisdictions were no longer subject to section 5’s
proscription on the implementation of retrogressive changes. Shelby
County, however, never suggested that the decision rendered the
consideration of retrogression taboo in section 2 cases. In fact,
Shelby County never mentioned retrogression at all. Instead, the
Court seemed to think that section 5 was no longer needed, largely
because section 2 itself provided a sufficient mechanism to address
the racial discrimination in voting that persists.117 Section 2’s ability
to perform this function—as the Court saw it—would have been
greatly impaired had Shelby County itself significantly narrowed
section 2’s reach. Indeed, the Court disavowed making any such
change.118 And yet, excising retrogression from the section 2 inquiry
would do just that.119 Shelby County provides no support for the
claim that evidence of retrogression is immaterial under section 2.120
110. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016).
111. See Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 557 (6th Cir. 2014),
vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). 
112. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 16.
113. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) (quoting S. REP. 97-417, at 30).
114. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 n.117 (emphasizing the fact that whether a contested
practice “markedly departs from past practices ... bears on the fairness of its impact”); see also
Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 768 F.3d at 558 (observing that the Senate Report
“invites comparison” between present and past practice in its discussion of tenuousness);
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
115. See 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
116. Id. at 2631.
117. See id. at 2619-20.
118. Id. at 2619, 2631 (stating that “Section 2 ... is not at issue in this case” and that the
Court’s “decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination”
set forth in that provision).
119. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
120. Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Volume 1 of the Appendix, supra note 71, at 2,
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Similarly flawed is the claim that consideration of backsliding
necessarily gives rise to a dangerous “one-way ratchet[ ].”121 This
claim posits that section 2 would bar jurisdictions from reducing or
eliminating more generous electoral practices were retrogression to
be treated as probative of a statutory injury.122 Section 2, however,
does not entrench existing policy in this way. Instead, it mandates
“a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present’ reality
and on a ‘functional’ view of the political process.”123 Challenged
practices are not evaluated as abstract rules but rather as part of
the web of electoral practices that organize the way voters vote in
the jurisdiction.124
Under this framework, a retrogressive electoral practice might
run afoul of section 2 in one place but cause no injury in another.125
In some circumstances, evidence of backsliding will be of little
consequence given the context in which the new rule operates. In
others, it will bolster the claim that a challenged practice violates
section 2. Either way, evidence of backsliding operates not as a “one-
way ratchet[ ],”126 but instead as one circumstance within the total-
ity. Put differently, whether or not a practice violates section 2 is
not determined by one factor, assessed independently from the web
16 (arguing that appellate court’s decision “guts” Shelby County and “restores the ... preclear-
ance standard”); Brief of the Appellants Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and Ohio Attor-
ney General Mike DeWine, supra note 88, at 57 (arguing that the district court erroneously
included retrogression in the section 2 inquiry “just three years after the Supreme Court
struck down that intrusive inquiry” in Shelby County); see also supra notes 109-14 and
accompanying text.
121. See Brief of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State John Husted and Ohio Attorney
General Mike DeWine, supra note 88, at 4, 56-58 (arguing that the lower court ruling blocking
cutbacks from an expansive voting law will discourage states from expanding voting oppor-
tunities).
122. See id.
123. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) (quoting S. REP. 97-417, at 30 & n.30
(1982)).
124. Cf. id.
125. See id. at 46 (recognizing that “at-large elections[ ] may not be considered per se viola-
tive of § 2,” even though many such schemes do minimize or cancel out minority voting power
in violation of the statute); see also Appellees’ Brief at 52-53, Ohio State Conference of the
NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-3877) (“Section 2 neither prohibits nor
freezes into place any particular set of election practices for all time across all jurisdictions,
but rather conditions liability on the ‘totality of circumstances,’ which may render particular
voting practices unlawful in some contexts but not others.” (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b))).
126. Brief of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and Ohio Attorney General
Mike DeWine, supra note 88, at 4.
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of practices within which it is situated, but instead through “a
searching practical evaluation”127 of a rule as it operates within the
network of rules comprising the local electoral process.128
This searching evaluation exposes the error not only with the
“one-way ratchet,” but also with the related claim that the consider-
ation of backsliding poses a threat to similar practices wherever
they are found.129 This claim posits that a section 2 injury based,
even in part, on a comparison between a challenged practice and the
practice it supplants necessarily calls into question every practice
that compares unfavorably to the supplanted practice.130 The result,
the argument goes, is an unjustified race to the top, in which the
most generous existing practice becomes the minimum practice sec-
tion 2 permits.131 Not so. Evidence that a contested practice is retro-
gressive does not mean the practice necessarily violates section 2.
Instead, evidence of backsliding is but one factor within the totality
of circumstances that inform the section 2 inquiry.
B. The Endowment Effect and the Race to the Bottom
Backsliding alone does not violate section 2, but it may neverthe-
less offer powerful evidence of a section 2 injury. While only one
factor within the totality, backsliding may cause distinct harm. As
has been long recognized, we value what we have more than what
we might obtain.132 As such, a departure from the status quo is often
more costly and requires greater justification than simply maintain-
ing the conditions the departure would create.133 For this reason, the
elimination of an existing electoral practice may cause cognizable
harm even when the failure to implement that practice in the first
instance may be unobjectionable. As one appellate court recently
127. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (quoting S. REP. 97-417, at 30).
128. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (Supp. III 2016).
129. Brief of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and Ohio Attorney General
Mike DeWine, supra note 88, at 4, 17, 56-58 (arguing that punishing Ohio for changing its
voting laws “discourage[s] other States, like New York or Michigan, from following Ohio’s lead
[of creating expansive laws]”).
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197-98 (1991).
133. See, e.g., id.
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observed, “removing voting tools ... meaningfully differs from not
initially implementing such tools.”134
The idea that retrogressive electoral practices do distinct damage
to voters is not new. Nearly sixty years ago, Gomillion v. Lightfoot
read the Fifteenth Amendment to bar a notorious Alabama gerry-
mander that removed almost every African American resident from
the City of Tuskegee.135 Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion for the
Court observed that the disputed legislation “fenc[ed] Negro citizens
out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal
vote.”136 For Justice Frankfurter, it was Alabama’s affirmative
decision to withdraw what was a “pre-existing” vote that critically
distinguished the gerrymander from what he viewed to be nonjust-
iciable electoral disputes.137 Colegrove v. Green, in which Justice
Frankfurter famously warned against entering the “political thick-
et,”138 involved a complaint “only of a dilution of the strength of ...
votes as a result of legislative inaction over a course of many
years.”139 The Gomillion plaintiffs, by contrast, challenged “affirma-
tive legislative action” that gave state “approval ... to unequivocal
withdrawal of the vote solely from colored citizens.”140
Justice Frankfurter’s effort to immunize legislative inaction of
this sort failed. Just two years after Gomillion, the Court rejected
the idea that malapportionment resulting from such inaction was
nonjusticiable, with Gomillion itself propelling the Court’s decision
to enter the thicket.141 Still, the action-inaction distinction Justice
Frankfurter pressed in Gomillion rested on the sound intuition that
backsliding resulting from affirmative legislative acts causes dis-
tinct injury. The VRA’s preclearance regime promoted this idea both
by using retrogression to define the substance of the section 5 prohi-
bition and by requiring covered jurisdictions to prove proposed elec-
toral changes were nondiscriminatory142 Likewise, section 2 itself
134. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 232 (4th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
135. 364 U.S. 339, 346-348 (1960).
136. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
137. See id. at 346-47.
138. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion).
139. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 202-04 (1962) (overruling Colegrove, 328 U.S. 549).
142. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (upholding Congress’s
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long recognized the distinct harm retrogression may cause, with
both the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 Amendments and
precedent construing the statute making clear that backsliding may
contribute to conditions that leave minority voters with less
opportunity to participate in the electoral process.143
The value we place on what we have helps explain why backslid-
ing in voting often proves so damaging.144 Plaintiff Rosanell Eaton
emphasized this point when she testified against North Carolina’s
SL 2013-381.145 Eaton, who is African American, had voted regularly
in North Carolina since 1942, when she passed the state’s literacy
test and first registered to vote.146 In 2013, Eaton nevertheless found
herself without identification that qualified under SL 2013-381 and
unable to vote in person without it.147 Eaton ran into trouble
because her voter registration card listed her name as “Rosanell
Eaton” while her driver’s license said, “Rosa Johnson Eaton.”148 To
resolve the discrepancy, Eaton testified that she made repeated
trips to state DMV offices, two Social Security offices, and three
banks.149 She estimated that she traveled two hundred miles and
devoted at least twenty hours of effort in order to secure qualifying
identification.150 Eaton said that this effort was “[a lot of] headache,”
decision “to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its vic-
tims”); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
While Congress arguably intended for the preclearance standard to reach beyond backslid-
ing, see Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 341-42 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part), there was always good cause to understand section 5, at a minimum, as a
device to stop jurisdictions from “pour[ing] old poisons into new bottles,” id. at 366.
143. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. 
144. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 232 (4th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
145. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 361
(M.D.N.C. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
1399 (2017).
146. Ari Berman, The 94-Year-Old Civil-Rights Pioneer Who Is Now Challenging North
Carolina’s Voter-ID Law, NATION (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-92-
year-old-civil-rights-pioneer-who-is-now-challenging-north-carolinas-voter-id-law/ [https://
perma.cc/6N4W-J2JD].
147. Cf. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F. Supp. at 361 (finding that
Eaton’s expiring driver’s license “would have been compliant for voting” so long as it met the
law’s “‘reasonable resemblance’ requirement,” which Eaton’s arguably did). 
148. See id. at 360-61; see also Berman, supra note 146.
149. Berman, supra note 146.
150. Id.
2018] SECTION 2 AFTER SECTION 5 1987
and that “[i]t was really stressful and difficult.”151 Eaton knew she
could have spared herself this “headache” by voting absentee, but
stated that she persevered to secure qualifying ID because she
places great value on casting her ballot in person. She testified, “[A]
lot [has been] done to get that opportunity and I personally love to
do it myself.... I wanted to exercise my rights ... and make that last
step to perform or maintain what I want to do.”152
North Carolina, of course, is under no obligation to ensure that
each voter gets to vote in the manner he or she most prefers. But
Eaton never claimed otherwise. Instead, her testimony, and that of
other witnesses who similarly valued voting in person,153 was pre-
sented to show the impact SL 2013-381 had on the voters most
affected by it.154 Far from asserting a right to some hypothetical
improvement to electoral practice,155 these witnesses spoke of their
personal experiences as voters and why SL 2013-381 hit them with
distinct force.156
Their experiences, however, are irrelevant insofar as backsliding
is immaterial under section 2. Under this view, the equality of
opportunity section 2 protects does not depend on and, thus, must
be assessed independently of, the context in which the contested
practice operates.157 Relentlessly abstract, this assessment man-
dates indifference to the web of circumstances that comprise the
local electoral process.
151. Id.
152. Plaintiffs’ Designations of Deposition Testimony: Transcript Excerpts Exhibit 7 at 23,
N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (Nos.
1:13-cv-658, 1:13-CV-660, 1:13-CV-861).
153. See Elizabeth M. Ryan, Injury and the Right to Vote: What North Carolina Teaches
About the Role of Dignity 4 (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author) (cataloging
testimony from North Carolina litigation and observing that “[w]itnesses testified that voting
is an act of pride and empowerment for many African Americans in North Carolina and
emphasized the significance of casting a ballot in person at a polling place”). 
154. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 360-62
(M.D.N.C. 2016), rev’d, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
155. See Brief of Appellees at 12-13, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831
F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 14-1845(L), 14-1856, 14-1859) (observing that “plaintiffs can
almost always hypothesize fewer restrictions on the manner of voting that could increase
minority opportunities or participation”).
156. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 360-62. 
157. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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It is accordingly far from happenstance that those insisting
backsliding is immaterial under section 2 also claim that a chal-
lenged practice comports with the statute so long as it is no worse
than the most restrictive practice presently in use. This claim posits
that exogenous electoral practices provide the best benchmark
against which to gauge whether a challenged practice violates sec-
tion 2.158 In other words, it promotes a retrogression rule of a differ-
ent sort, one that immunizes all but the worst extant practice.159
This retrogression rule fosters a destructive race to the bottom in
which an ever-sinking floor defines the scope of the section 2 prohi-
bition.
North Carolina, for example, repeatedly invoked outside practice
as a full defense for the cutbacks SL 2013-381 imposed. In the
district court, the State emphasized “[t]he fact that the legislative
bodies of a majority of States have not adopted the measures” that
2013-381 cut back.160 The State told the appellate court that “[a]
determination that ... North Carolina is in violation of Section 2
because it does not offer SDR or out-of-precinct voting could ‘place
in jeopardy the laws’ of dozens of states that do not offer these
practices.”161 Later, seeking Supreme Court review, North Carolina
argued that the appellate court had given insufficient weight to the
fact that new law “simply aligned North Carolina with [practices] in
other states.”162
Ohio, too, invoked practices in other states in response to the ar-
gument that its cutbacks in early in-person voting violated section
2. Ohio insisted that this argument would have “‘far-reaching im-
plications’ for the States with fewer [early voting] options today.”163
Offering a similar response to the constitutional challenge to the
cutbacks, the State queried, “If a complete lack of EIP voting does
not burden the fundamental right to vote, how can having ‘only’ 22
158. See, e.g., Brief of Appellees, supra note 155, at 12.
159. See, e.g., id.
160. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 465.
161. Brief of Appellees, supra note 155, at 12. 
162. Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Volume I of the Appendix, supra note 71, at 18.
163. See Brief of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and Ohio Attorney Gen.
Mike DeWine, supra note 88, at 49 (quoting Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1254
(M.D. Fla. 2012)).
2018] SECTION 2 AFTER SECTION 5 1989
days of no-excuse EIP voting do so?”164 In a similar vein, an amicus
defending Texas’s long-contested voter ID measure insisted that,
“[p]rior to Shelby County, a state law making superior voting laws
less superior, but still superior to the minimum requirements,
would not have been actionable under VRA §2.”165
Courts have also relied on more restrictive exogenous practices as
cause to reject section 2 challenges. For instance, a panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed past practice as
irrelevant under section 2, while emphasizing that opportunities for
early voting in Ohio were “really quite generous” when compared to
practices in other states.166 Similarly, the district court in the North
Carolina litigation observed that various provisions in SL 2013-381
simply brought state practice into parity with “less generous” elec-
toral practices that were “in the mainstream of other States.”167 
Surrounding practice, of course, is not irrelevant under section 2.
Like retrogression, the practices used in other jurisdictions are
properly included as part of section 2’s “totality of circumstances” re-
view.168 But just as retrogression alone does not suffice to establish
a section 2 violation, exogenous practices cannot alone render a
challenged practice either compliant or noncompliant with section
2.169 The section 2 inquiry is unavoidably complex. Electoral prac-
tices are evaluated as part of the web of electoral rules that organize
the way voters vote in the jurisdiction, such that an electoral prac-
164. Reply Brief of Appellant, The Ohio General Assembly, supra note 14, at 9; see Brief
of Appellants Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine,
supra note 88, at 49.
165. Brief for Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in Support of
Defendants-Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 80, at 9.
166. Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 623, 639-40 (6th Cir. 2016).
167. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 404-05, 455,
506-07, 512, 527, 529-530 (M.D.N.C. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017); see also Jacksonville Coal. for Voter Prot. v. Hood, 351 F.
Supp. 2d 1326, 1335-36 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (citing practices in other states among reasons to
deny section 2 claim).
168. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (Supp. III 2016); cf. S. REP. 97-417, at 29 n.117 (1982) (noting
that the fact “the procedure markedly departs from ... practices elsewhere in the jurisdiction
... bears on the fairness of its impact” without addressing the relevance of practices in other
jurisdictions (emphasis added)).
169. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881-82 (1994) (plurality opinion) (observing that
the prevalence of a more generous practice elsewhere in the state “tells us nothing” about the
effect of the more restrictive practice within the county where it operated).
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tice might violate section 2 in one place and cause no injury in
another.170
For these reasons, those claiming backsliding is immaterial under
section 2 are not proposing a minor or technical adjustment to the
statute, but instead a radical move that would displace the founda-
tional premise on which the statute rests. Section 2 rejects bright-
line rules, be they floors or ceilings, in favor of a multifactored local
assessment premised on the understanding that electoral practices
operate differently in different contexts and communities. The effort
to excise backsliding insists that context does not matter and that
electoral practices are best understood as abstract rules evaluated
independently of the environment in which they operate. This con-
struction of section 2 guts the statute as thoroughly as would a
congressional repeal.
CONCLUSION
To critics of Shelby County, the deluge of electoral restrictions
enacted in the decision’s wake was proof the Court terminated
section 5 prematurely.171 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had warned
that the progress evident in places where the preclearance obliga-
tion applied depended critically on the statute’s continued oper-
ation,172 and the zeal with which public officials moved to make
voting more difficult, particularly for the most vulnerable voters,
seemed to prove her point.173 Others, however, were more sanguine,
seeing the new regulations simply as the manifestation of the exer-
cise of sovereignty that had been unlawfully compromised.174
Shelby County was emphatic that its decision to lift the preclear-
ance obligation “in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on
170. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
172. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2650 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discrim-
inatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not
getting wet.”).
173. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, Supreme Court Recognizes Jim Crow’s Demise, Restores Consti-
tutional Order, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/
supreme-court-recognizes-jim-crows-demise-restores-constitutional-order/ [https://perma.cc/
3EBT-NRLB].
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racial discrimination” set forth in section 2.175 This assertion was
arguably crucial to Shelby County’s holding insofar as the Court’s
willingness to terminate preclearance reflected its view that section
2 itself provided adequate protection against whatever racial dis-
crimination remained in the electoral process. While Justice Gins-
burg appropriately disputed section 2’s adequacy in this regard,176
the majority’s insistence that section 2 was “not at issue in this
case”177 made clear the Justices anticipated that section 2 would
continue to operate as it had. Nothing in Shelby County suggests the
Court anticipated that section 2’s reach would contract dramati-
cally.
Making backsliding immaterial under section 2 would radically
narrow the statute’s reach. It would do so in contravention of Shelby
County as well as decades of precedent construing the VRA and
Congress’s intent in crafting the statute. Far from an incremental
adaptation, the move launches a restructuring of section 2 so foun-
dational as to constitute its repeal.
175. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631; John Yoo, Why Today Is Better Than Yesterday,
NAT’L REV.: THE CORNER (Jun. 25, 2013, 7:29 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/351
9851/why-today-better-yesterday-john-yoo [https://perma.cc/6HXS-H5WV].
176. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2636, 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining ways
in which section 2 provided incomplete protection).
177. Id. at 2619 (majority opinion).
